The recent attempted Coup in Turkey has given fodder to the anti-nuclear movement given the potential that Incirlik Airbase may have US Nuclear weapons. The usual people are already being allowed to speak by the media, with the New Yorker running an article by Eric Schlosser. And one can't argue that there may be nukes at Incirlik and if there are they would be B-61s since B-61s are the only tactical nuclear free-fall bombs left in the arsenal.
But the one thing both Schlosser and Han's Kristensen don't mention is the command and control systems used to prevent unauthorized use of these bombs. They made mention of the fact that when we had Jupiter IRBMs in Turkey, the missiles were operated by Turkish military units. But the warhead on top could only be released by the US Air Force Liaison officer assigned to the unit.
Going back to the early 60s, our bombs were equiped with a Permissive Action Link (PAL). In the early years this was a very special pad lock that when installed blocked key functions of the bomb (meaning it couldn't detonate). Complete equipping of all european based nuclear weapons was completed in September of 1962 (one of the first orders of JFK). Over the decades these devices have been significantly improved. Where the originals were padlocks, the present ones are actually embedded within the bomb and are thus impossible to bypass. Modern nuclear weapon controls are powered by radio-isotopes, have external command and control links. duel release codes, etc. As of the late 80s a 12 digit code had to be inserted, and you had a limited number of tries before the bomb self destructed key components.
Now some would like to say that all anyone has to do is drop the bomb, or set it on fire, to cause an explosion. But that is where the bombs presently in stockpile make this impossible. Since the late 80s the newest models of the B-61 have been using insensitive high explosives. The bomb could be dropped into a blast furnace from 20 stories up and it would not set the bomb off. Thus even if someone was to through thermite grenades into the storage bunker for the bombs they wouldn't cause a detonation. And the move the bombs off site would require first the defeating of the 1,000 American troops guarding the airbase and then removing the bombs without setting off the security systems. Security systems that would damage key components of the bomb's detonation system if any tampering is detected. And of course while all this is happening additional American units (airborne or seaborne) would be moving to assist the troops at Incirlik. This would not be Benghazi.
But the one thing both Schlosser and Han's Kristensen don't mention is the command and control systems used to prevent unauthorized use of these bombs. They made mention of the fact that when we had Jupiter IRBMs in Turkey, the missiles were operated by Turkish military units. But the warhead on top could only be released by the US Air Force Liaison officer assigned to the unit.
Going back to the early 60s, our bombs were equiped with a Permissive Action Link (PAL). In the early years this was a very special pad lock that when installed blocked key functions of the bomb (meaning it couldn't detonate). Complete equipping of all european based nuclear weapons was completed in September of 1962 (one of the first orders of JFK). Over the decades these devices have been significantly improved. Where the originals were padlocks, the present ones are actually embedded within the bomb and are thus impossible to bypass. Modern nuclear weapon controls are powered by radio-isotopes, have external command and control links. duel release codes, etc. As of the late 80s a 12 digit code had to be inserted, and you had a limited number of tries before the bomb self destructed key components.
Now some would like to say that all anyone has to do is drop the bomb, or set it on fire, to cause an explosion. But that is where the bombs presently in stockpile make this impossible. Since the late 80s the newest models of the B-61 have been using insensitive high explosives. The bomb could be dropped into a blast furnace from 20 stories up and it would not set the bomb off. Thus even if someone was to through thermite grenades into the storage bunker for the bombs they wouldn't cause a detonation. And the move the bombs off site would require first the defeating of the 1,000 American troops guarding the airbase and then removing the bombs without setting off the security systems. Security systems that would damage key components of the bomb's detonation system if any tampering is detected. And of course while all this is happening additional American units (airborne or seaborne) would be moving to assist the troops at Incirlik. This would not be Benghazi.